Michael P. O\u27Connor, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Gary W. Burningham, Jeanna Burningham, Sandy Phillips, RUby Ray, Drew Downs, Curt Parke, Mike Powell, Barbara Powell, Steve Davis, Jan Dacis, Todd Kirkpatrick, Sue Chandler, Dallie Haderlie, Wendy Haderlie, Sheldon Worthington, John C. Rogers, Kenny Norris, Robyn Norris, Will Sunderland, Darlene Durrant, Blair Swenson, Paula Swenson, Robert T. Price, Kent Beckstead, Lisa Gray, John Jex, Jessica Johnson, Jeff Burningham and John Does 1-50 : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Michael P. O'Connor, Plaintiff/Appellant, vs. Gary
W. Burningham, Jeanna Burningham, Sandy
Phillips, RUby Ray, Drew Downs, Curt Parke, Mike
Powell, Barbara Powell, Steve Davis, Jan Dacis,
Todd Kirkpatrick, Sue Chandler, Dallie Haderlie,
Wendy Haderlie, Sheldon Worthington, John C.
Rogers, Kenny Norris, Robyn Norris, Will
Sunderland, Darlene Durrant, Blair Swenson, Paula
Swenson, Robert T. Price, Kent Beckstead, Lisa
Gray, John Jex, Jessica Johnson, Jeff Burningham
and John Does 1-50 : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Joseph C. Rust; Matthew G. Bagley; Kesler & Rust; Attorneys for Appellant.
Harold L. Petersen; Peterson & Associates; Attorney for Appellees Gary and Jeanna Burningham;
Michael W. Homer; Jesse C. Trentadue; John D. Luthy; Suitter Axland, PLLC; Attorneys for
Appellees.
Joseph C. Rust Matthew G. Bagley KESLER & RUST 2000 Beneficial Life Tower Salt Lake City, UT
84111 Telephone:(801) 532-8000 Attorneys for Appellant
Harold L. Petersen PETERSON & ASSOCIATES 230 South 500 East Suite 400 Salt Lake City, UT
84102 Telephone:(801) 328-5555 Attorney for Appellees Gary and Jeanna Burningham
Michael W. Homer Jesse C. Trentadue John D. Luthy SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 8 East Broadway,
Ste. 200 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Telephone:(804) 532-7300 Attorneys for Appellees
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, O\'Connor v. Burningham, No. 20060090 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6262
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MICHAEL P. O'CONNOR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GARY W. BURNINGHAM, JEANNA 
BURNINGHAM, SANDY PHILLIPS, 
RUBY RAY, DREW DOWNS, CURT 
PARKE, JULIE PARKE, MIKE POWELL, 
BARBARA POWELL, STEVE DAVIS, JAN 
DAVIS, TODD KIRKPATRICK, SUE 
CHANDLER, DALLIE HADERLIE, 
WENDY HADERLIE, SHELDON 
WORTHINGTON, JOHN C. ROGERS, 
KENNY NORRIS, ROBYN NORRIS, WILL 
SUNDERLAND, DARLENE DURRANT, 
BLAIR SWENSON, PAULA SWENSON, 
ROBERT T. PRICE, KIM M. PRICE, KENT 
BECKSTEAD, SUZANNE BECKSTEAD, 
LISA GRAY, JOHN JEX, JESSICA 
JOHNSON, JEFF BURNINGHAM, and 
JOHN DOES 1-50, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20060090 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH, JUDGE JAMES R. TAYLOR PRESIDING 
Joseph C. Rust 
Matthew G. Bagley 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone:(801) 532-8000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Harold L. Petersen 
PETERSON & ASSOCIATES 
230 South 500 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone:(801) 328-5555 
Attorney for Appellees Gary 
and Jeanna Burningham 
Michael W. Homer 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
John D. Luthy 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Ste. 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone:(804) 532-7300 
](lftMtfr<fyBfbr Appellees 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
MICHAEL P. O'CONNOR, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
GARY W. BURNINGHAM, JEANNA 
BURNINGHAM, SANDY PHILLIPS, 
RUBY RAY, DREW DOWNS, CURT 
PARKE, JULIE PARKE, MIKE POWELL, 
BARBARA POWELL, STEVE DAVIS, JAN 
DAVIS, TODD KIRKPATRICK, SUE 
CHANDLER, DALLIE HADERLIE, 
WENDY HADERLIE, SHELDON 
WORTHINGTON, JOHN C. ROGERS, 
KENNY NORRIS, ROBYN NORRIS, WILL 
SUNDERLAND, DARLENE DURRANT, 
BLAIR SWENSON, PAULA SWENSON, 
ROBERT T. PRICE, KIM M. PRICE, KENT 
BECKSTEAD, SUZANNE BECKSTEAD, 
LISA GRAY, JOHN JEX, JESSICA 
JOHNSON, JEFF BURNINGHAM, and 
JOHN DOES 1-50, 
Defendants/Appellees. 
Case No. 20060090 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES 
APPEAL FROM A GRANT OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
DEFENDANTS IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
UTAH, JUDGE JAMES R. TAYLOR PRESIDING 
Joseph C. Rust 
Matthew G. Bagley 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone:(801)532-8000 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Harold L. Petersen 
PETERSON & ASSOCIATES 
230 South 500 East 
Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Telephone:(801)328-5555 
Attorney for Appellees Gary 
and Jeanna Burningham 
Michael W. Homer 
Jesse C. Trentadue 
John D. Luthy 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
8 East Broadway, Ste. 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone:(801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Appellees 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
"[W]e thought I would put my name in for an opportunity." 3 
Head Coaching Responsibilities 5 
"There's yelling, yeah. There's nothing wrong with that." 5 
"[She was] our best player . . . [and] all our girls knew that." 7 
"[I]t would be out of compliance now but it wasn't then." 8 
"You're going to get fired . . . if you don't 
answer to what you're doing with the money." 10 
Timeline of Relevant Communications 11 
"[Tjhere is no problem so I have nothing I need to work on." 14 
O'Connor's Publication of the Letters 16 
The Lawsuit 16 
Filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs and Notice of Appeal 18 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 18 
20 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS 
BECAUSE O'CONNOR HAS NOT IDENTIFIED, AS TO EACH OF 
THE PARENTS, A STATEMENT THAT IS CAPABLE OF 
SUSTAINING A DEFAMATORY MEANING 20 
A. O'Connor Has Failed to Identify a Specific Allegedly 
Defamatory Statement as to Each Parent Defendant 20 
B. Communications that O'Connor References as Forming 
the Basis of His Claims Are Not Capable of Sustaining 
a Defamatory Meaning 23 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS 
BECAUSE (1) O'CONNOR WAS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL AND (2) 
O'CONNOR FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING OF ACTUAL MALICE 25 
A. O'Connor Was a Public Official 26 
1. Public School Teachers are Public Officials 27 
2. Public High School Varsity Team Coaches 
are Public Officials 29 
3. O 'Connor's Particular Coaching Position 
Made Him a Public Official 30 
4. O 'Connor's Arguments Against the 
Conclusion that He Was a Public Official 
Are Unavailing 31 
B. O'Connor Has Adduced No Evidence that the Parents 
Acted With Actual Malice 34 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS 
BECAUSE THEIR STATEMENTS WERE ABSOLUTELY 
PRIVILEGED 38 
-ii-
IV. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT 
OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS 
BECAUSE (1) THEIR STATEMENTS WERE QUALIFIEDLY 
PRIVILEGED AND (2) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE 
PARENTS ABUSED THE PRIVILEGE 39 
A. The Parents Statements Were Qualifiedly Privileged 40 
B. There Is No Evidence that the Parents Abused Their 
Qualified Privilege 46 
V. THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS ISSUES 
REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO THE 
PARENTS BECAUSE THOSE ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT, AND IN ANY EVENT THE PARENTS' 
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS WAS TIMELY FILED 48 
CONCLUSION 50 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 51 
(Pursuant to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(l 1), an Addendum hereto is being filed separately.) 
-iii-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules 
United States Constitution amend. I 2 
Utah Constitution art. I, § 1 2 
Utah Constitution art. I, § 15 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(l)(a) 39 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0) 1 
Utah R. App. P. 3(d) 3,49 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) 22 
UtahR. App. P. 24(a)(H) iii 
Utah R. Evid. 201(b) 29 
Federal Cases 
Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 
491 U.S. 657, 109 S. Ct. 2678 (1989) 34 
New York Times v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964) 34 
Revell v. Hoffman, 
309 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2002) 34, 35 
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 
383 U.S. 75, 86 S. Ct. 669 (1966) 33 
Utah Cases 
Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 
2001 UT App 63, 21 P.3d 667 41 
Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 
791 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 40,46, 47 
-iv-
Br enemy v. Nordstrom, Inc., 
812 P.2d 49 (Utah 1991) 24, 39, 40,41,43 
Cox v. Hatch, 
761 P.2d 556 (Utah 1988) 20,26 
Dennett v. Smith, 
21 Utah 2d 368,445 P.2d 983 (Utah 1968) 21,23 
InreK.B., 
7 Utah 2d 398,326 P.2d 395 (1958) 27 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 
669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983) 49, 50 
Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 
797 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1990) 30, 31, 32 
Mortensen v. Life Ins. Corp., 
315 P.2d283 (Utah 1957) 38, 39 
Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 
842 P.2d 896 (Utah 1992) 1, 2, 21 
Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 
626 P.2d 968 (Utah 1981) 34 
Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 
910 P.2d 1252 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 2 
Star key v. Bd. ofEduc, 
381 P.2d 718 (Utah 1963) 32 
State v. Jameston, 
800 P.2d 798 (Utah 1990) 2 
State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 22 
Van Dyke v.KUTV, 
663 P.2d 52 (Utah 1983) 25,26,27, 30, 31, 33,34 
-v-
Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasing, Inc., 
2005 UT 25, 116 P.3d 271 1, 21, 47 
Westv. Thomson Newspapers, 
872 P.2d 999 (Utah 1994) 1, 21, 23, 24 
Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Center, Inc., 
2005 UT App. 325, 122 P.3d 891 21 
Cases From Other States 
Campbell v. Robinson, 
955 S.W.2d 609 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) 28 
Cor bally v. Kennewich Sch. Dist., 
973 P.2d 1074 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) 27 
Daubenmire v. Sommers, 
805 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) 42, 48 
Doggett v. Regents of Univ. of California, 
2003 WL 21666102 (July 1, 2003 Cal. Superior) 22,23 
Els from v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 270, 
533 N.W.2d 51 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) 28, 29 
Gatto v. St. Richard School, Inc., 
114 N.E.2d 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) 42 
Hoover v. Jordan, 
150 P. 333 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915) 42 
Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 
583 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1978) 28 
Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 
855 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993) 29, 30 
Kelly v. Bonney, 
606 A.2d 693 (Conn. 1992) 28 
Martin v. Kearney, 
124 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1975) 42 
-vi-
Nodarv. Galbreath, 
462 So.2d 803 (Fla. 1984) 44,46 
Sewell v. Brookbank, 
581 P.2d 267 (Ariz. 1978) 28, 36, 37, 42, 48 
Standridge v. Ramey, 
733 A.2d 1197 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) 29 
Treatises and Restatements 
L. Eldredge, The Law of Defamation § 86 at 471 (1978) 44 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 323 41 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324 41 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 (1977) 40, 46 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 cmt. d (1977) 40, 41 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595 (1977) 43,44,46 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 (1977) 41,42,46 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 597 (1977) 41,46 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 603 cmt. a (1977) 48 
-vii-
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The plaintiff, Michael P. O'Connor ("O'Connor"), appeals from a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants who had not already been dismissed from the case (the 
"Parents"). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Issue: Whether O'Connor has met his burden of identifying, as to each defendant, a 
statement capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. 
Standard of Review: Whether a plaintiff has met the burden of identifying, as to each 
defendant, a statement capable fo sustaining a defamatory meaning is a question of 
law. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994). 
2. Issue: Whether O'Connor was a "public official" for purposes of defamation. 
Standard of Review: The determination of a defamation plaintiffs public official 
status is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See Wayment v. Clear Channel 
Broadcasing, Inc., 2005 UT 25, f 17, 116 P.3d 271. 
3. Issue: Whether O'Connor adduced evidence that the Parents acted with "actual 
malice." 
Standard of Review: "Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of 
malice is a question of law." Russell v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896,905 
(Utah 1992). 
4. Issue: Whether the Parents' statements were absolutely privileged. 
Standard of Review: "The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the 
[C]ourt." Id. at 900. 
5. Issue: Whether the Parents9 statements were qualifiedly privileged. 
Standard of Review: "The existence of a privilege is a question of law for the 
[CJourt." Id 
6. Issue: Whether O'Connor adduced evidence that the Parents acted with "common 
law malice." 
Standard of Review: "Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of 
[common law] malice is a question of law." Id. at 905. 
7. Issue: Whether issues regarding the district court's award of costs are properly before 
this Court. 
Standard of Review: Whether issues are properly before this Court is a question of 
law. See State v. Jameston, 800 P.2d 798, 801-02 (Utah 1990). 
8. Issue: Whether the Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was timely filed. 
Standard of Review: "The application of the time limit is also a question of law, 
reviewed for correctness." Selvage v. J.J. Johnson & Assocs., 910 P.2d 1252, 1257 
(Utah CLApp. 1996). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES 
United States Constitution amend. I 
Congress shall make no law.. . abridging the freedom of speech 
. . . or the right of the people . . . to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances. 
Utah Constitution art. I, § 1 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to . . . petition 
for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their thoughts 
and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
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Utah Constitution art. I, § 15 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of 
speech or of the press. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(l)(a) 
No civil action by or on behalf of a student to the professional 
competence or performance of a licensed employee of aschool 
district,... or a violation of ethical conduct by an employee of 
a school district, may be brought in a court until at least 60 days 
after the filing of a written complaint with the local board of 
education of the district, or until findings have been issued by 
the local board after a hearing on the complaint, whichever is 
sooner. 
Utah R. App. P. 3(d) 
The notice of appeal. . . shall designate the judgment or order, 
or part thereof, appealed from. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
O' Connor brought a lawsuit alleging defamation against thirty-one named defendants. 
Four of those defendants were dismissed from the lawsuit. The remaining defendants (the 
Parents) moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion and dismissed, 
with prejudice, O'Connor's claims against the Parents. The district court also awarded costs 
to the Parents. Prior to the district court's order awarding costs to the Parents, O'Connor 
filed a notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"[W]e thought I would put my name in for an opportunity/' 
While attending Brigham Young University ("BYU"), O'Connor was a student 
teacher and assistant coach to Dave Houle, a full-time teacher and coach at Mountain View 
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High School in Orem, Utah. (R. 1145a, 1146a.)1 Following graduation from BYU, 
O'Connor worked as the head coach of the girls' basketball team at Bellflower High School 
for about seven years. (R. 1147a.) 
Beginning in about 1998, O'Connor applied for four other coaching positions in 
California. (R. 1145,1145a.) He received one offer, which he declined. (Id.) Then, in the 
spring of 2001, Dave Houle called O'Connor and told him that there might be a teaching and 
coaching position opening at Mountain View High School in Orem. (R. 1145a.) O'Connor 
traveled to Utah to submit an application with the Alpine School District and apply for the 
position. (R. 1144,1145a.) Although he was interviewed for the position at Mountain View 
High School, the job was offered to someone else. (R. 1144.) 
After her husband did not get the job at Mountain View High School, O'Connor's 
wife found a posting on the Alpine School District's web page for a position at Lehi High 
School as the head coach of the girls' basketball team. (R. 1146.) O'Connor and his wife 
"thought [he should] put [his] name in for an opportunity," so he called Lehi High School 
and left a message, saying that he had an application on file with the district and was 
interested in the position at Lehi High School. (R. 1144.) The Lehi High School principal, 
Mr. Sheldon Worthington, then called O'Connor and initiated an interview. (R. 1144.) After 
the District agreed to allow O'Connor to teach sociology and American problems classes 
1
 Some pages in the Record have information on both sides; however, Record numbers 
appear only on the front of each page. Accordingly, for clarity, citations in this brief to the 
front side of a page in the Record are made by simply referencing the appropriate page 
number, i.e., R. 100. Citations to the reverse side of a page in the Record are made by 
referencing the appropriate page number and adding an"a," i.e., R. 100a. 
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(courses for which he lacked a teaching endorsement), O'Connor accepted an offer to teach 
and coach at Lehi High School. (R. 1142, 1143, 1143a, 1144a.)2 
Head Coaching Responsibilities 
As head coach, O'Connor oversaw the budget for the Lehi High School girls' 
basketball program, which was allocated from public funds. (R. 1136.) He also oversaw a 
number of fundraising efforts, which raised money through donations directly from members 
of the community. (R. 1137,1137a.) O'Connor decided which girls made the team, and he 
was responsible for the activities of those girls while on the team. (R. 1121.) He was also 
responsible for a coaching staff of four assistant coaches. (R. 1140, 1141a.) O'Connor 
directed the team's travel, not only with respect to regular season road games, but also to the 
annual state playoff tournament and to an annual invitational tournament in Arizona. (R. 
1106,1108a, 1137a.) He was also responsible for the girls' participation in a spring league, 
summer workouts, and a team camp during the spring or summer. (R. 1103 a.) 
"There's yelling, yeah. There's nothing wrong with that." 
With O'Connor at the helm, the Lehi High School girls' basketball team's winning 
percentage improved (R. 659), but his approach to communicating with the girls caused 
concern among some parents. (R. 1105a.) In this regard, O'Connor testified as follows: 
Q. Okay? You were approached by the parents who had 
some concern on how you were treating their daughters, 
screaming at them, yelling at them; right? 
2
 O'Connor states that "while successfully coaching in California," he "was recruited 
to coach at Lehi High School." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) There is no Record evidence 
regarding his success in California, and he was "recruited" by only to the extent that 
Principal Worthington returned his phone message and initiated the interview process. 
-5-
A. I've had some come to me, yes. 
Q. So it's not true that you were not aware of the concern 
that you were screaming and yelling at the players? 
A. It wasn't - I mean it depends how we're defining 
screaming and yelling here. 
Q. Well, right now we're defining it the way the parents did 
when they approached you and asked you not to do it. 
A. I've had some come to me about their daughter being 
yelled at, yes. 
(R. 1105a.) 
Q. Did you ever scream and rave at the girls? 
A. I yelled as, like I said earlier last time, like any other 
coach. 
(R. 1106a.) 
Q. You see where it says "Harrison said the team gets yelled 
at sometimes when they fail to run plays or follow 
directions, but said she's grown accustomed to that in 
sports." Is that a true statement? 
A. There's yelling, yeah. There's nothing wrong with that. 
(R. 1098a.) 
Q. Well, you had - you indicated there's at least two that 
talked to you about screaming at their children. 
A. One during that season, one during her sophomore 
season two years prior. 
Q. So you knew that there were those concerns as well? At 
least on the part of those parents? 
A. That particular parent. And we worked that out with that 
daughter. 
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Q. And you didn't scream at her anymore? 
A. We worked around that. 
Q. Had you screamed at her? 
A. Have I yelled at her? As a coach yells at players, yeah. 
(R. 1104a.) 
"[She was] our best player.. . [and] all our girls knew that." 
During the 2003 to 2004 season, there also developed a concern among players and 
parents that O'Connor favored one girl on the team over the others and treated her 
differently. (E.g., R. 1157.) Specifically, Michelle Harrison ("Michelle") was considered 
by O'Connor to be the "best player" on the team, and he believed that "all [the] girls knew 
that [she was]." (R. 1110.) Indeed, as O'Connor observes in his brief, "[subsequent to the 
filing of this appeal, [Michelle] was named the top high school girls basketball player in Utah 
by The Deseret News and was named to the McDonalds All Americans, an honor given to 
the top 24 high school senior girl basketball players in the U.S." (Appellant's Brief, p. 7.) 
Accordingly, when Michelle was a sophomore, O'Connor named her to be one of the two 
team captains, and he told the seniors on the team that they could take turns filling the other 
captain slot. (R. 1110.) O'Connor also testified that Michelle was not required to abide by 
standards imposed on other team members in that, at two different tournaments, he allowed 
Michelle to travel and room with her mother (and stay out late on one occasion), while the 
rest of the team was required to travel on the team bus and stay together. (R. 1127, 1127a.) 
Michelle was also allowed during games to wear a different color of shoes than the other 
girls, who were all required to all wear the same color of shoes. (R. 1167.) O'Connor denied 
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other allegations of preferential treatment toward Michelle (e.g., R. 1106, 1107a.) but 
acknowledged "that there were problems with team unity." (R. 1126.) Ultimately, 
O'Connor admitted telling the team that if they caused Michelle to leave Lehi High School 
he would quit as their coach. (R. 1102a.) When school administrators discussed the asserted 
preferential treatment with Michelle's mother, she responded: "Well, I can do whatever I 
damn well please No one would have stopped me." (R. 1164.) 
"[I]t would be out of compliance now but it wasn't then/' 
In addition to issues related to O'Connor's coaching style and preferential treatment 
of Michelle, there were concerns raised by some parents that O'Connor may have improperly 
recruited Megan Heriford ("Megan") to transfer from Mountain View High School to Lehi 
High School. (R. 1159a.) In this regard, O'Connor testified that he knew Megan before she 
transferred to Lehi High School and that her parents contacted him regarding their desire that 
she transfer to Lehi High School for her senior season. (R. 1139,1139a.) O'Connor testified 
that Megan's parents told him that they wanted Megan to transfer to Lehi High School in 
order to have "an opportunity to play." (R. 1139a.) Correspondingly, Parents of girls 
already on the team were concerned 
that the only reason [Megan] was coming to play for Lehi is 
because she could not make the team from Mountain View, that 
she wasn't going to have a starting role or a major role or that 
she would see little or no playing time, where coming to Lehi 
she would be able to make a contribution to the program. But 
by thus doing, she would displace other girls who had been in 
the program. 
(R. 1159a.) 
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O'Connor testified that he advised the Herifords to contact the Lehi High School 
assistant principal in charge of athletics to make sure that if Megan transferred, it would be 
in compliance with the rules of the Utah High School Athletic Association ("UHSAA"). (R. 
113 9a.) O' Connor then also called the assistant principal himself to notify him that "that [the 
Herifords] were thinking of transferring [and] that they may be calling him." (Id.) 
At the time, a student could transfer schools in compliance with UHSAA rules by 
either (1) obtaining written consent from the principals of both schools, or (2) physically 
moving into the new school's boundaries. (R. 1138.) The Herifords moved to within the 
Lehi High School boundaries (id.\ and Lehi High School conducted "home visits . . . to the 
residence to make sure that they did, in fact, have a residence in the attendance area." (R. 
1159a.) Principal Worthington testified that, after the school's investigation, he concluded 
that O'Connor had not engaged in wrongful recruiting under the UHSAA rules in effect at 
the time. (Id.) The evidence is unclear, however, as to whether Lehi High School actually 
notified the concerned parents of the results of this investigation, where Principal 
Worthington testified as follows: 
A. Did I believe he was wrongfully recruiting? No. 
Q. Did you discuss that with the parents, your belief? 
A. I didn't specifically. My assistants did. They said that 
they would follow up to make sure that we were totally 
compliant with UHSAA rules and that was done. 
(Id) Principal Worthington also testified that, although permissible at the time, Megan's 
transfer to Lehi High School would be out of compliance with current UHSAA rules. (R. 
1159a.) 
-9-
"You're going to get fired . . . if you don't answer 
to what you're doing with the money." 
Finally, concerns were raised that O'Connor may have been mishandling monies 
raised by the girls. (E.g., R. 776.) Ms. Judi Harrison, Michelle's mother, told O'Connor of 
this concern in November of 2003, stating: "You're going to get fired for the money if you 
don't answer to what you're doing with the money." (R. 776, 1138a.) In response, 
O'Connor called a meeting for all of the parents with girls on the team. (R. 776.) At least 
one parent of each girl on the team attended the meeting. (R. 1137.) There, although 
O'Connor explained his position with respect to team finances (R. 837-41) and "kept asking 
for questions" the parents "didn't ask [any questions]." (R. 775.) 
Some parents took their concerns regarding O'Connor's possible mishandling of funds 
to school administrators. (R. 1248,1269.) The school investigated and concluded that there 
had been no mishandling of funds by O'Connor. (R. 1248, 1268.) But the school did not 
communicate the results of their investigation to the concerned parents, as Principal 
Worthington testified: 
A. I can see how parents might misconstrue or 
misunderstand, not having knowledge of how public 
education funds are used, how they're recorded, the 
purchasing procedures. So I - this is not the first time 
that a coach or staff member has been questioned about 
monies. 
Q. Do you believe that it's constructive - well, you believe 
that that issue had been resolved through your 
investigation, correct? 
A. I believe it was resolved. 
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Q. And you believe that was communicated back to the 
parents? 
A. I don't know to what degree. I think it was mentioned, 
but I didn't write, I mean I didn't make an attempt to 
communicate to every parent. 
(R. 1248.) 
Timeline of Relevant Communications 
Some of the foregoing concerns were raised with school administrators in November 
2003, prior to the start of basketball season. (R. 1160.) At that time, Principal Worthington 
discussed the concerns with his assistant principals, and they decided to simply monitor the 
situation. (Id.) In March 2004, after the conclusion of the state tournament in February, 
several parents again raised their concerns with school administrators. (R. 1160a, 1168a.) 
In response, the principal, athletic director, and assistant coaches met with a number of 
parents individually. (R. 1159, 1166a, 1167.) After talking to, and receiving letters from, 
a number of the parents, administrators met with O'Connor and informed him of the parents 
concerns. (R. 1159,1159a.) O'Connor, however, expressly refused to meet with the parents 
as a group to discuss their concerns. (R. 1138.) Accordingly, the parents held a meeting of 
their own on March 9, 2004, and minutes were kept of this meeting. (R. 1015-17.) 
On April 14, 2004, Principal Worthington sent a letter to the parents, in which he 
stated in part: 
I recently had the opportunity to speak with several of you about 
ways to improve . . . basketball program.... 
It was interesting to me that everyone no matter whose daughter 
was on the team wanted the same thing. It was also interesting 
that even though individual perceptions were at times directly in 
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opposition with each other, everybody spoke with a conviction 
and passion that was compelling. Where in lies the truth? The 
truth lies in each one's perception. Individual perception 
becomes the truth no matter what did or didn't happen. The 
question really becomes, "What is each person, parent, player, 
and coach willing to do?" If one is not willing to try to change 
their perception, there is no point in trying because whatever is 
done will never be good enough. If this is your reality, perhaps 
the best thing for you to do is to move to another community 
and program.. . . 
Upon review of the whole situation we have set forward the 
following guidelines and recommendations: 
1. We have spoken to Coach O'Connor and given him 
recommendations shared with us by all parents. He has 
committed to examine and improve the program 
wherever he can. He has our full support. 
4. Parents are invited to express any concerns they might 
have to LHS administration. We will carefully consider 
each concern brought to our attention and pass it along. 
6. We ask that you communicate to the coaches individual 
concerns of schedule conflicts, injuries, illness, etc., and 
items related to [team parties and rides to practice]. All 
other communication should go through administration. 
7. We ask our coaches to coach. Do not contact any coach 
for anything other than the aforementioned items. 
Violation of this rule will jeopardize your daughter's 
position on the team. 
(R. 1171-72 (emphasis in original).) 
By June, some parents still had concerns regarding O'Connor. (R. 1152,1152a.) One 
parent, Gary Burningham, approached Alpine School Board member Donna Barnes for 
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direction. (Id.) Being fairly new to the Board, Ms. Barnes contacted the School Board 
president, who told Ms. Barnes: "This is not without precedent. You need to tell them that 
they should build a case." (R. 1151a.) Ms. Barnes then told Mr. Burningham: "you have 
to make your case." (R. 1152a.) Thus, several weeks later, Mr. Burningham delivered to 
Ms. Barnes a set of letters, some from parents and some from other relatives and friends of 
girls on the team. (R. 1152a, 1015-87.) Ms. Barnes read the letters and then gave them to 
the secretary of the school superintendent.3 (R. 1151, 1152a.) 
A few weeks later, concerned parents and others attended the regularly-scheduled 
School Board Meeting on July 20, 2004. (R. 1008-13.) At that meeting, five parents 
addressed the board regarding their concerns with the Lehi High School girls' basketball 
program.4 (R. 1011-12.) Ms. Barnes testified about the School Board meeting as follows: 
Q. Okay. Do you personally believe that the parents were 
exercising their rights as parents living in the school 
district to voice concerns at a school board meeting about 
what they perceived to be problems? 
A. That's the policy of the board, that if there are concerns, 
they may address the board in an open board meeting. It 
happens routinely. 
3
 O'Connor cites pages 1233-37 and 1243 and asserts that Ms. Barnes was "[a]cting 
in her private capacity and not as an official act of the School Board" (Appellant's Brief, p. 
9), but he identifies no evidence in these pages to support that conclusion. 
4
 O'Connor states that "four of the Parents" addressed the School Board, "the 
maximum allowed to speak by the Board." (Appellant's Brief, p. 9.) Five parents addressed 
the Board, but one of them was not named as a defendant; thus, only four "Parents" 
addressed the Board. Also of note, O'Connor is unable to point to any evidence that the 
Board allowed only five people to speak. While not important substantively, this is another 
example of O'Connor's tendency to recite "facts" that are not supported by the Record. 
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Q. Was everyone courteous and attempting to — 
A. Very courteous, very professional in their behavior. 
Q. Okay. And certainly there's nothing unusual about 
parents writing letters to be reviewed by the board as 
supplemental information to -
A. We get those routinely also. 
Q. Okay. And did you consider those to be constructive 
letters in attempting to resolve a problem? 
A. I did. 
(R. 1151a, 1239.) The letters that Mr. Burningham had given to Ms. Barnes were not 
distributed during the meeting. (R. 1151.) After the meeting, the School Board gave the 
letters to Principal Worthington. (R. 1157.) He chose not to read them. (Id.) Instead, he 
gave them to a vice principal, Rick Robbins, and asked him to show them to O'Connor. (R. 
1165.) Three school administrators - (1) Mr. Robbins, (2) the athletic director, Mr. Allan, 
and (3) another Vice Principal, Mari Braithwaite - then met with O'Connor to show him the 
letters. (Id.) However, none of these administrators read the letters themselves. (R. 1157.) 
"[T]here is no problem so I have nothing I need to work on." 
O' Connor's response to the letters was ccthat there was no problem." (R. 1165a.) Even 
when "Mr. Robbins mentioned . . . that there was a perception that there is [a problem] and 
as the coach we need to take ownership in those perceptions," O'Connor's response "still 
was that there is no problem so I have nothing I need to work on." (Id.) Indeed, although 
Mr. Worthington and Mr. Allan offered "to meet with [O'Connor] with parents, to go to their 
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homes if we needed to and visit with them," O'Connor "didn't respond." (R. 1155a.) 
Principal Worthington was then informed that O' Connor had said he might cut from the team 
two daughters of parents he believed had been particularly outspoken. (R. 1158.) Principal 
Worthington responded by telling O'Connor that he could not cut girls "based on what their 
parents had done": 
I indicated to him that these girls, one girl was, as a sophomore 
started every game on the season, was a major player; the other 
one received a large amount of playing time. I told him that if 
they were cut from the team, it would have to be that those that 
were coming into the program were clearly superior ball players 
than they were. 
(R. 1158a.) 
Q. What did Coach O'Connor say to you in response to your 
telling him that he could not cut these two girls? 
A. Coach O'Connor was upset about that. He reiterated the 
fact that he should be able to cut who he wants to, that 
that was his decision to make as coach. 
(Id.) Because O'Connor refused to agree not to cut girls from the team on the basis that their 
parents had expressed concerns regarding him, Principal Worthington relieved O'Connor of 
his duties as head coach of the girls' basketball team. (R. 1157a.) In this regard, Principal 
Worthington testified as follows: 
Q. If Coach O' Connor had committed to you that these girls 
would not be cut from the team, would he have been 
released? 
A. No. 
Q. So that was the straw as it were? 
A. Yes, sir. 
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(Id.)5 O'Connor, however, was retained as both a teacher and a coach at Lehi High School. 
(R. 1250.) 
O'Connor's Publication of the Letters 
After being given the letters that the parents submitted to the School Board, O'Connor 
shared them with Michelle's mother. (R. 1110a.) Michelle's mother then arranged a 
meeting between herself; O'Connor's attorney, Mr. Rust; and a newspaper reporter. (R. 
1088,1089.) At that meeting the letters were present and discussed. (R. 1089.) O'Connor, 
though not present at that meeting (R. 1189a), also shared portions of the letters with the 
newspaper reporter when she interviewed him. (R. 1109.) 
The Lawsuit 
O'Connor filed a defamation lawsuit against twenty-seven Parents.6 (R. 1-8.) When 
asked during discovery to identify a defamatory statement made by each of the Parents, 
O'Connor designated as defamatory (1) the oral statements of some of the Parents at the 
March 9, 2004 parents meeting, (2) the oral statements made by some of the Parents at the 
July 20,2004 School Board meeting, (3) and thirty-seven different letters, comprising at least 
60 pages. (R. 1008-82,1085-87.) In no legal pleading has O'Connor identified, as to each 
5
 Citing pages 1224-25 of the Record, O'Connor states that "[a]s a direct result of the 
Parents' defamatory publications, [he] was terminated as the girls basketball coach." 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 10.) However, pages 1224-25 are from the affidavit of Michelle's 
father, in which he simply gives his "opinion that the reason Principal Worthington did not 
renew [O'Connor's] coaching position in the fall of 2004 was because of the defamatory 
comments of [the Parents]." 
6
 O'Connor originally named thirty-one defendants; four were later dismissed. The 
Parents are those defendants who were not dismissed prior to summary judgment. 
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of the Parents, a separate statement attributable to each that he believes is defamatory. (E.g., 
R. 1178-1222.) Indeed, even in his brief on appeal, O'Connor identifies no specific language 
he believes is defamatory. (Appellant's Brief, generally.) Rather, in his statement of facts, 
he summarizes the letters broadly, in his own words,7 without quoting them, and without 
identifying specific statements attributable to specific Parent defendants. (Id, pp. 7-11.) 
Then, in the argument section of his brief, he simply says: "[The] defamatory 
communications are amply cited in the Material Facts submitted to the trial court and 
supported as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 56." (Id., p. 14.) 
During his deposition, O'Connor testified as a lay fact witness with some specificity 
regarding which specific statements he regards as defamatory. (E.g., R. 1130,113 la.) In so 
doing, as to at least four of the letters, O'Connor could not identify anything about the letter 
that he believed to be defamatory, only that the letter ccwas with the rest of the letters" (R. 
1099), was "used as part of the whole group" (R. 1101), was "just part of everything else" 
(R. 1101a), or was defamatory when "looking at the whole picture" (R. 1130a). 
Furthermore, seven of the letters O'Connor designates as defamatory were authored or co-
authored by persons who were not named as defendants in the underlying lawsuit - Chad 
Hillstead, Kade Hillstead, Michael Hyde, Amanda Hyde, Kayla Burningham, Breezy 
Chandler, and Mrs. Jex. (R. 8, 1185-86.) Additionally, one of the letters was co-authored 
7
 In at least one blatant respect, O'Connor's characterization of the letters is wholly 
unsupported by the Record. Specifically, he states that the letters accuse him "of physical 
. . . abuse," and he supports this statement with a citation to sixty pages of the Record. 
(Appellant's Brief, p. 8.) Nowhere in those pages is there any reference to O'Connor 
physically abusing the girls. (R. 718-78.) 
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by John Jex, who was dismissed from the lawsuit. (R. 896-97,1185.) Likewise, three of the 
statements made at the March 9, 2004 parents meeting (which O'Connor designates as a 
source of defamation against him) were made by persons who were not named as defendants 
in the underlying lawsuit - Robert Gray, Michael Hyde, and Cindy Hyde. (R. 1015-17.) 
Filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs and Notice of Appeal 
On January 11,2006, the trial court entered its final judgment in favor of the Parents. 
(R. 1366.) The Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was thus due on January 19,2006. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 6(a), 54(d)(2). The Parents mailed their Verified Memorandum of Costs 
from Salt Lake City to the court in Provo, and to O'Connor's counsel, on January 18,2006. 
(R. 1487,1540.) The filed Verified Memorandum of Costs bears a date stamp of January 20, 
2006, at 9:30 a.m. (R. 1494.) The trial court ultimately awarded costs to the Parents. (R. 
1553.) 
On January 17,2006, prior to filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs, or the trial 
court's ruling on O'Connor's Motion to Tax the Verified Memorandum of Costs, O'Connor 
filed his Notice of Appeal from "the final judgment issued . . . on January 10, 2006." (R. 
1495, 1552-60.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
O'Connor nowhere identifies, as to each of the twenty-seven Parent defendant, a 
specific statement that is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. Rather, he has 
dumped on the Court the burden of combing the record to identify and analyze such a 
statement as to each Parent defendant. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment on the basis that O'Connor is a public 
official and produced no evidence that the Parents acted with actual malice. A public official 
is a public employee whose position is one that attracts public comment and scrutiny of the 
person holding it, regardless of whether there has been any particular controversy raised. 
O'Connor's varsity head coaching position plainly fits this description, and he has adduced 
no evidence that the Parents' statements were made with actual malice. 
Even if O'Connor were not a public official, the Parents' statements were absolutely 
privileged. The United States and Utah Constitutions each protect the right of citizens to 
petition government officials for redress of grievances. This right is absolute in the context 
of quasi-judicial proceedings of boards that hold discretion to apply the law to the facts. This 
Court should hold that, given the statutory authority vested in school boards of this state, the 
Parents communications to the Alpine School Board were absolutely privileged. 
The Parents' communications of which O'Connor complains, were also qualifiedly 
privileged. A qualified privilege protects statements between persons sharing a common 
interest. The Parents and school administrators shared a common interest in the welfare of 
girls on the team and in the qualifications of public school teachers. When a common 
interest exists, a plaintiff must prove common law malice to sustain a defamation action. 
O'Connor has adduced no evidence of common law malice. 
Finally, O'Connor's Notice of Appeal did not designate the trial court's ruling on 
costs as part of the judgment appealed from, as required. Thus, issues regarding the award 
of costs are not properly before the Court. Even if they were, the Parents' Verified 
Memorandum of Costs was timely filed. 
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ARGUMENT 
L 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE 
O'CONNOR HAS NOT IDENTIFIED, AS TO EACH OF THE 
PARENTS, A STATEMENT THAT IS CAPABLE OF SUSTAINING A 
DEFAMATORY MEANING. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Parents because O'Connor has not identified, as to each of the Parent defendants, a statement 
that is capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. This is so in two respects. First, 
O'Connor has fundamentally failed to even identify a specific, separate statement as to each 
Parent defendant that he claims is defamatory. Second, communications that O'Connor 
references generally as forming the basis of his defamation claims are not capable of 
sustaining a defamatory meaning. 
A. O'Connor Has Failed to Identify a Specific Allegedly Defamatory 
Statement as to Each Parent Defendant. 
O'Connor begins the argument section of his brief on appeal by asserting that "the 
communications at issue were capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning." (Appellant's 
Brief, p. 13.) However, he has failed to identify a specific, allegedly defamatory statement 
as to each Parent defendant, and his claims against the Parents must, therefore, fail.8 
8
 This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court (R. 987, 1319-20); and, 
although the trial court did not base its summary judgment ruling on this ground, the "long-
standing rule is that this Court may affirm a judgment of a lower court on a ground other than 
that relied on by that court." Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 561 (Utah 1988). 
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In Utah, a defamation Plaintiff need not identify in his complaint "with complete 
specificity when, where, to whom, or by whom, the alleged defamatory statements were 
made." Zoumadakis v. Uintah Basin Med. Center, Inc., 2005 UT App. 325, f 3, 122 P.3d 
891. Even at the pleading stage, however, the plaintiff is required to "set forth in words or 
words to that effect" the "language complained of." Dennett v. Smith, 21 Utah 2d 368,445 
P.2d 983, 984 (Utah 1968). This case is well past the pleading stage. At this point, a 
plaintiffs identification of the when, where, to whom, by whom, and specific words that 
support his defamation claims must, as to each claim, be specific enough to allow a court to 
determine "[w]hether a [particular] statement is capable of sustaining a defamatory 
meaning." West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1008 (Utah 1994) (emphasis 
added). For example, in West, both the trial and appellate courts examined specific phrases 
within newspaper editorials to determine whether the words used were defamatory. See id. 
at 1001-03,1008-1 \\seealso, e.g., Waymentv. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 
25, Tf 51, 116 P.3d 271 (setting forth two specific sentences as alleged defamation); Russell 
v. Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 898 (Utah 1992) (identifying and analyzing 
specific quotations from a newspaper article that plaintiff believed to be defamatory). 
Here, O'Connor merely summarizes in his own words over sixty pages of allegedly 
defamatory material. Moreover, he admits that a number of these communications are not 
defamatory of themselves but only defamatory "with the rest of the letters" or viewed "as 
part of the whole group." (R. 1099, 1101.)9 Additionally, seven of the letters O'Connor 
9
 In a sense, O'Connor thus seems to be pursuing a joint and several liability theory 
of defamation where, because ail of the Parents were speaking on the same general topic, 
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designates as defamatory were authored or co-authored by persons who are not named as 
defendants in this case. One of the letters was co-authored by John Jex, who was been 
dismissed from the lawsuit; and, three of the statements made at the March 9,2004 parents 
meeting were made by persons who were also not named as defendants in the underlying 
lawsuit. With respect to his burden to identify, as to each Parent defendant, a particular 
statement which he believes to be defamatory, O'Connor has overlooked the caution that 
"[t]his [Cjourt is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the burden of 
argument and research." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998). While O'Connor 
cites proper authority for what constitutes defamation in Utah, he does not engage in 
application of that authority to any single specific statement by any single Parent defendant. 
"Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) [of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure] requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority." Id. In this respect, O'Connor has not complied with rule 24, but rather has 
"shift[ed] the burden of research and argument to [this] [C]ourt." Id. 
In Doggettv. Regents of Univ. of California, 2003 WL 21666102 (July 1, 2003 Cal. 
Superior), although the plaintiff alleged the defendants had said or implied "[t]hat Plaintiff 
was a 'traitor' . . . [tjhat Plaintiff 'couldn't be trusted'... [and t]hat no one likes a 'snitch, 
tattle-tale,'" he lost on summary judgement because he had "fail[ed] to identify any 
they are each responsible for the specific words used by every other Parent, and even by 
parents, friends, and family members of girls on the team not named as defendants. Yet 
O'Connor cites no authority for such an approach. On the contrary, the settled rule is that 
for each defamation claim there must be a particular statement made by a particular person, 
capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning. 
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defamatory statement attributable to any individual defendant." Id. at *2-*3. O'Connor's 
case suffers from the same deficiency. He has failed to identify at least one specific, 
allegedly defamatory statement published by each of the Parents leaves both the Parents and 
this Court in the untenable position of having to sift through and dissect the numerous letters 
and oral communications he identifies, predicting the phrases he may find objectionable, and 
then setting forth analysis based on these guesses that the words do not sustain a defamatory 
meaning. That is not this Court's burden. Nor is it the Parents'. Speaking of the specificity 
with which plaintiffs must plead defamation, this Court has said: "[T]he defendant should 
not be required to resort to the ofttimes expensive discovery process to drag from a litigant 
what he really intends to do to his adversary by a vehicle shrouded in mystery." Dennett, 
445 P.2d at 984. Here, the expensive discovery process has ended, O'Connor has had ample 
chance to identify the defamatory statements upon which he relies, and still the identity of 
those statements remains "shrouded in mystery." Id. Accordingly, the Court affirm 
summary judgment in favor of the Parents on the ground that O'Connor has failed to identify 
as to each Parent defendant "a statement... capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning." 
West, 872P.2datl008. 
B. Communications that O'Connor References as Forming the Basis of His 
Claims Are Not Capable of Sustaining a Defamatory Meaning. 
Without assuming O'Connor's burden to identify the specific statements upon which 
he bases his defamation claims, the Parents note that communications representative of those 
he identifies as the basis for his claims are not capable of sustaining a defamatory meaning.10 
10
 This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court (R. 987.) 
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This is because the letters and other communications upon which O'Connor purports to base 
his defamation claims contain expressions of opinion and/or verifiable fact. "[Expressions 
of pure opinion fuel the marketplace of ideas[,] . . . are incapable of being verified, [and] 
cannot serve as the basis for defamation liability." West v. Thompson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 
999, 1015 (Utah 1994).11 Additionally, "[i]n this state, truth is an absolute defense to an 
action for defamation." Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 57 (Utah 1991). By way 
of example, O'Connor identifies the following letter from Parent defendant Ruby Ray as the 
sole possible basis for his defamation claim against her: 
To Whom It May Concern: I write this letter to address my 
concern of the program at Lehi High School, Girls Basketball. 
I have watched my granddaughter go from a very confident 
Young Lady, that loves basketball, to a timid not sure of her self 
player. She loves the game and wants to continue playing as 
long as time allows. However I know that as long as things stay 
the same at Lehi, and every play needs to run through one 
player, I don't see her wanting to play. 
In following the girls basketball program all season, I noticed 
that one player stood out in all the stats the paper would give. 
I don't for a minute discount her as a great player, however at 
games I was able to attend, I could see that she was left in even 
when Lehi was up by a very safe distance. I could not see why 
the others on the bench were left to sit and watch instead of 
building the team for the future. I know that it is important to 
develop your best players, however I think it is also just as 
important to develop your whole team. I am concerned, I think 
things need to be changed in the program. 
One last thing I would like you to consider, I think the pressure 
put on this one girl by the coach is not healthy. At the state 
11
 Notably, the trial court found that "[a]ll of the declarations [of which O'Connor 
complains] appear to be forthright descriptions of what they had observed coupled with their 
opinion as to the effect of the situation upon their children." (R. 1349.) 
-24-
tournament this past year she fell apart. I think she blamed 
herself, and I think the pressure she felt was just too much for a 
high school sophomore. 
Sincerely Ruby Ray 
(R. 1082.) Many of the statements in this letter are mere opinion - i.e., "I know that as long 
as things stay the same at Lehi , . . . I don't see [my granddaughter] wanting to play." And, 
while others may be construed as factual assertions - i.e., "every play needs to run through 
one player" - O'Connor has cited no evidence to show that they are not true or are in dispute. 
This is especially true of allegedly defamatory statements regarding O'Connor's 
communications with the girls - i.e., "He also had her so scared of touching the ball, afraid 
she might be yelled at or called a name." (R. 1080) - where O'Connor admits to having 
regularly yelled at the girls. Even had O'Connor identified a specific statement by each 
Parent defendant, it is likely that any such statement would be an expression of opinion or 
of admitted fact. Accordingly, this Court should affirm on this additional ground the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Parents. 
II. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE 
(1) O'CONNOR WAS A PUBLIC OFFICIAL AND (2) O'CONNOR 
FAILED TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A FINDING OF 
ACTUAL MALICE. 
O' Connor's claims against the Parents are for defamation. A defamation plaintiff that 
is deemed to be a "public official" may not recover "for a defamatory falsehood relating to 
his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice' - that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." 
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Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1983). The trial court concluded that, in light of 
the undisputed facts, O'Connor was a public official. The trial court also concluded that 
there is no evidence to support a finding of actual malice on the part of the Parents. The trial 
court then granted summary judgment in favor of the Parents on the basis of these two 
conclusions. This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor 
of the Parents because, indeed, (1) O'Connor was a public official, and (2) O'Connor failed 
to adduce evidence to support a finding of actual malice on the part of the Parents. 
A. O'Connor Was a Public Official. 
O'Connor was a public official. To be a public official, one must, like O'Connor, be 
a public employee. See Cox v. Hatch, 761 P.2d 556, 560 (Utah 1988). However, "not all 
public employees are 'public officials,' and those who are 'public officials' do not have that 
legal status for every kind of defamation." Id. Thus, for "public official" status to apply in 
a particular case, two conditions must be met: "(1) . . . the person must occupy a position 
which invites public scrutiny, and ( 2 ) . . . the alleged defamation must relate to the conduct 
of the person while in that capacity." Id. As to the second of these elements, O'Connor does 
not dispute that the statements of which he complained relate to his conduct as a public high 
school coach. As to the first element, the undisputed evidence shows that O'Connor 
occupied a position that invited public scrutiny and was, therefore, a public official. 
This Court has elaborated on the first of the two foregoing elements by explaining that 
a person is a public official when employed in a public position that "'has such apparent 
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance 
of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and 
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performance of all government employees.9" Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 54-55 (citation omitted). 
Stated another way, "'the employee's position must be one which would invite public 
scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and 
discussion occasioned by the particular charges in controversy."9 Id. at 55 (citation omitted). 
Under the foregoing standard, O'Connor clearly was a public official. 
L Public School Teachers are Public Officials. 
O'Connor insists that the public official inquiry in this case is whether public school 
teachers are, in every instance, public officials.12 As O'Connor observes, Utah courts have 
not addressed whether a public school teacher is a public official. However, this Court has 
observed that "[i]n civilized societies since antiquity it has been realized that the welfare, 
training and education of children are of such vital importance as to be a matter of public 
concern." In re KB., 7 Utah 2d 398, 401, 326 P.2d 395, 396 (1958). This Court has also 
stated, in the context of a "public official" analysis, that "'where public matters are involved, 
the doubts should be resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.'" Van 
Dyke, 663 P.2d at 54 (citation omitted). As the logical extension of these expressions, this 
Court should concur with those other jurisdictions holding that public school teachers are 
public officials. See Cor bally v. Kennewich Sch. Dist, 973 P.2d 1074,1077 (Wash. Ct. App. 
12
 In reality, the question of O'Connor's public official status does not necessarily turn 
on such a broad inquiry. Rather, the issue may be narrowly cast as whether the head coach 
of a public high school varsity basketball team who has authority over a substantial budget, 
staff, roster, fixndraising activities, and travel schedule, and who coaches an exceptionally 
talented and nationally recognized player, is a public official. This issue will be addressed 
following response to the broad assertion that public school teachers generally cannot be 
deemed public officials. 
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1999); Campbellv. Robinson, 955 S.W.2d 609,612 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); Elstrom v. Indep. 
Sch. Dist. No. 270, 533 N.W.2d 51, 56 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Kelly v. Bonney, 606 A.2d 
693,711 (Conn. 1992); Johnston v. Corinthian Television Corp., 583 P.2d 1101,1103 (Okla. 
1978); Sewellv. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267,270 (Ariz. 1978). Of particular note is the sound 
reasoning of the Connecticut Supreme Court and of the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The 
Connecticut Supreme Court explains: 
Robust and wide open debate concerning the conduct of the 
teacher in the schools of this state is a matter of great public 
importance. . . . [TJeachers' positions, if abused, potentially 
might cause serious psychological or physical injury to school 
aged children. Unquestionably, members of society are 
profoundly interested in the qualifications and performance of 
the teachers who are responsible for educating and caring for the 
children in their classrooms. Further, teachers exercise almost 
unlimited responsibility for the daily implementation of the 
governmental interest in educating young people. In the 
classroom, teachers are not mere functionaries. Rather, they 
conceive and apply both policy and procedure. As a result of 
that significant public interest, it is also likely that the media 
would not only provide a teacher about whom allegations have 
been made with an opportunity to respond, but that the media 
would encourage comment by the teacher. Therefore, we 
conclude that . . . the plaintiff school teacher was a public 
official for defamation purposes. 
Kelly, 606 A.2d at 711. The analysis of the Minnesota Court of Appeals is similar: 
We conclude that a public school teacher is a public 
official. We note that Minnesota strongly emphasizes 
education. Also, teachers act with the authority of the 
government. Teachers who abuse their positions may affect 
many lives [0]ur society gives teachers great authority and 
holds them in a position of special trust. Given this authority, 
the public has a greater than normal interest in being able to 
debate and criticize freely the conduct of public school teachers. 
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Elstrom, 533 N.W.2d at 56 (quotation and citations omitted). Utah's commitment to 
education is no less than that of these states, and the authority and trust reposed in the 
teachers of this state is no less significant. Given these considerations, this Court should 
likewise conclude that public school teachers are public officials for defamation purposes. 
2. Public High School Varsity Team Coaches are Public Officials. 
However, the Court need not determine that all public school teachers are public 
officials to affirm the trial court's conclusion that O' Connor was a public official. O' Connor 
was not simply a public school classroom teacher. He was head coach of the Lehi High 
School girls' basketball team.13 This Court may take note of the fact that "[h]igh school 
sports are played not only for the general training and education of the athletes but are 
sources of entertainment and interest in the community." (R. 1350); see Standridge v. 
Ramey, 733 A.2d 1197, 1202 (N.J. Super. Ct App. Div. 1999) ("We may take note of the 
fact that the performance of high school athletic teams is often a matter of substantial public 
interest within a community."); Utah R. Evid. 201(b) ("A judicially noticed fact must be one 
not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is . . . generally known within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the trial court[.]"). Indeed, it may be noted that even the major newspapers 
in this state regularly report on high school athletics. As head coach, O'Connor had 
responsibility over the budget for the girls' basketball program, which was allocated from 
13
 See Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1993) (stating that "Johnson was more than a school teacher; he also was the athletic 
director and head football coach," and emphasizing that the court's conclusion that Johnson 
was a public official was "not based on Ed Johnson's status as a school teacher, for we do 
not hold, and no Texas case has held, that a school teacher is a public official"). 
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public funds. He also oversaw the raising of thousands of dollars of other monies by the 
team directly from members of the community, and it was within his discretion how to spend 
those funds. O'Connor determined which of the girls who tried out for the team became 
team members. He oversaw team travel to games at other schools, state playoff tournaments, 
and an invitational tournament in Arizona. He coordinated the girls' participation in a spring 
league, summer tournament, and a team camp; and, he supervised four assistant coaches. 
Given the foregoing, it cannot be disputed that the coaching position just described is "one 
which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding it, entirely apart 
from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the particular charges in [this case]." Van 
Dyke, 663 P.2d at 55; see Johnson v. Southwestern Newspapers Corp., 855 S.W.2d 182,187 
(Tex. Ct. App. 1993) ("As head [high school] football coach, [plaintiff] filled a position of 
such importance that the public not only had, but exhibited, an independent interest in his 
qualifications and performance, transcending any interest shown in other employees of the 
school system."). 
5. O'Connor's Particular Coaching Position Made Him a Public 
Official 
Furthermore, as O'Connor himself highlights, he was the coach of an exceptionally 
talented player who was eventually named the top high school girls basketball player in Utah 
and one of the top twenty-four senior girl basketball players in the country. In Madsen v. 
United Television, Inc., 797 P.2d 1083 (Utah 1990), this Court was asked to determine 
whether a police officer was a public official. The Court stated: 
In light of the particular facts of this case, we need not, and 
therefore do not, reach the issue of whether a police officer is 
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ipso facto a public official. Here, plaintiff was or became a 
public official by virtue of the facts and circumstances which 
gave rise to [his] killing of [a suspect]. . . . The fact that 
plaintiff, acting in his capacity as a law enforcement officer, 
shot and killed a person he was attempting to apprehend 
propelled him into a category far-removed from that of an 
ordinary patrolman. 
Id. at 1085. In other words, the plaintiff in Madsen was in a unique position relative to most 
other police officers, and that unique position put him more squarely in the public eye and 
gave the public more reason to scrutinize the manner in which he discharged the 
responsibilities of his position. See id. Similarly here, O'Connor was in a unique position 
relative to most other high school coaches in that he was coaching a player with inordinate 
talent. This situation placed O'Connor more squarely in the public eye and gave the public 
more reason to scrutinize the manner in which he discharged his coaching responsibilities 
(including balancing the competing interests of girls with varying skill levels). Hence, even 
if there were doubt that a public high school varsity basketball coach with authority over a 
substantial budget, staff, roster, fundraising activities, and travel schedule is ipso facto a 
public official, the added fact that O'Connor was coaching an exceptionally talented, 
nationally recognized, player tips the balance in favor of O'Connor's public official status. 
Anyone coaching Michelle would invite public scrutiny and discussion, entirely apart from 
the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by particular charges. See Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 55. 
4. O 'Connor's Arguments Against the Conclusion that He Was a Public 
Official Are Unavailing. 
The few arguments O'Connor makes in favor of a contrary conclusion reveal a 
misapprehension of applicable law. First, O'Connor misreads the requirement that a public 
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official be in a position regarding which "'the public has an independent interest in the 
qualifications and performance of the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest 
in the qualifications and performance of all government employees.'" Id. at 54-55 (citation 
omitted). Relying on this language, he asserts that a high school coach cannot be a public 
official because "[t]he coaching selection process is not put to public vote nor determined by 
public input but rather is handled internally at the administrative level. . . . Nor does the 
public have some right in the termination of a high school coach." (Appellant's Brief, p. 20.) 
O'Connor cites, however, no authority for the proposition that to be a public official the 
general public must have formal input in decisions regarding one's hiring or firing. In fact, 
this Court's holding in Madsen is directly at odds with that implied assertion, where the 
public has no formal input on the hiring and firing of police officers and yet the plaintiff 
police officer in that case was deemed to be a public official. See 797 P.2d at 1085. 
Next, O'Connor asserts that, because extracurricular activities in public schools are 
a privilege and not a right, see Starkey v. Bd. ofEduc., 3 81 P.2d 718, 721 (Utah 1963), "the 
hiring, firing or retention of a high school English teacher is more important than that of a 
high school team coach." (Appellant's Brief, p. 21.) He continues: "Arguably the janitorial 
staff and food service personnel in any public school have more impact and contact with the 
general student body than does any particular coach." (Id.) Thus, he concludes, "if a high 
school girl's basketball coach is a position of such 'apparent importance' that the public at 
large has an 'independent interest' in that person's qualifications and performance, then in 
truth there is no public employment that would not qualify for 'public official' status." (Id.) 
However, public official status does not turn on whether the employee provides a 
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constitutionally protected service (such as, perhaps, English education). Nor does it turn on 
an objective determination of the value to the community of a public employee's position. 
Rather, it turns on whether the position held by the public employee is one that actually 
invites public scrutiny, regardless of whether such scrutiny is merited. Thus, the Supreme 
Court speaks in terms of "apparent importance" of the position and whether the "public has 
an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of the person who holds it," not 
whether the public should have such independent interest. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 
86, 86 S. Ct. 669,676 (1966) (emphasis added); see also Van Dyke, 663 P.2d at 55 (rejecting 
the argument 6Cthat to label [the director of financial aid at Weber State University] a 'public 
official' would shield almost all defamatory comment directed against an individual of every 
rank" because such a contention "omits the element of [actual] debate on public issues"). 
Finally, O'Connor urges this Court to follow those jurisdictions that have concluded 
that public school teachers are not public officials for purposes of defamation. He cites cases 
from five such jurisdictions: California, Florida, Illinois, Maine, and New Jersey. However, 
all but one of the cases he cites deal solely with public school teachers generally, not with 
varsity high school coaches. As set forth above, the evidence is undisputed that O'Connor 
was a public official by virtue of his coaching position, regardless of whether all public 
school teachers are public officials. Additionally, the reasoning of the Connecticut and 
Minnesota courts set forth above is compelling in favor of a conclusion that public school 
teachers are public officials and rests on general principles espoused by this Court and public 
policy in this state. Accordingly, O'Connor's reliance almost exclusively on cases holding 
that public school teachers generally are not public officials is unavailing to him. 
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B. O'Connor Has Adduced No Evidence that the Parents Acted With 
Actual Malice. 
As demonstrated, O'Connor was a public official. "[A] public official [may not 
recover] for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the 
statement was made with 'actual malice[.]'" Van Dyke v. KUTV, 663 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 
1983). O'Connor has adduced no evidence that the Parents acted with actual malice, and his 
claims must, therefore, fail. 
To show actual malice, O'Connor must present evidence that the Parents' statements 
were made "[1] with [actual] knowledge that [they were] false or [2] with reckless disregard 
of whether [they were] false or not." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,280, 84 S. 
Ct. 710, 726 (1964). To show reckless disregard for the truth, "'[t]here must be sufficient 
evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to 
the truth of his publication.'" Seegmiller v. KSL, Inc., 626 P.2d 968, 972 (Utah 1981) 
(citation omitted; emphasis added). "This inquiry is 'a subjective one - there must be 
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant actually had a "high degree 
of awareness of . . . probable falsity."'" Revell v. Hoffman, 309 F.3d 1228, 1233 (10th Cir. 
2002) (quotingHarte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657,688,109 
S. Ct. 2678,2696 (1989) (emphasis added)). As the trial court concluded, "fnjowhere [in the 
Record] is there any indication that any of the persons who were criticizing [O' Connor] knew 
or should have known that they were speaking a falsehood or that they were reckless or 
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uncaring as to whether what they were saying was true or not." (R. 1349-50.)14 
O'Connor forwards two arguments in support of a contrary conclusion. First, he 
contends that the following "evidence" also suggests that the Parents statements were made 
with actual malice: 
The Parents repeated their allegations of financial improprieties 
after having explanations and clarifications given them by both 
O'Connor and the high school administration Likewise, the 
Parents repeated their allegations of abuse, recruiting violations 
and favoritism after due investigation by the Principal and his 
communication to the Parents that no such problems existed. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 33-34.) However, although O'Connor did hold a meeting to explain 
his position with respect to team finances (R. 837-41), the Parents did not probe the situation 
by asking questions of O'Connor at that meeting (R. 775 (testimony of Judy Harrison that 
O'Connor "kept asking for questions and people just didn't ask them")). "Actual malice . 
. . is not based on whether a 'reasonably prudent' person would have conducted further 
investigation prior to publishing." Revell, 309 F.3d at 1233 (citation omitted). Moreover, 
O'Connor's assertion that the principal and/or others in the school administration told the 
Parents that their concerns were unfounded is simply at odds with the evidence in the Record. 
Principal Worthington testified in this regard as follows: 
Q. . . . [Y]ou believe that that issue [regarding financial 
improprieties] had been resolved through your 
investigation, correct? 
A. I believe it was resolved. 
14
 Indeed, as set forth above, the Parents' statements largely contained expressions of 
opinion, which are not even capable of being true or false. 
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Q. And you believe that was communicated back to the 
parents? 
A. I don't know to what degree. I think it was mentioned, 
but I didn't write, I mean I didn't make an attempt to 
communicate to every parent. 
(R. 1248.) In fact, the letter that Principal Worthington sent to the Parents following his 
"investigation" steadfastly avoided any conclusion regarding the validity of the Parents' 
expressed concerns; rather, it stated: 
It was . . . interesting that even though individual perceptions 
were at times directly in opposition with each other, everybody 
spoke with a conviction and passion that was compelling. 
Where in lies the truth? The truth lies in each one's perception. 
Individual perception becomes the truth no matter what did or 
didn't happen. The question really becomes, "What is each 
person, parent, player, and coach willing to do?" If one is not 
willing to try to change their perception, there is no point in 
trying because whatever is done will never be good enough. If 
this is your reality, perhaps the best thing for you to do is to 
move to another community and program that is best suited to 
your daughter's situation.... 
. . . We have spoken to Coach O'Connor and given him 
recommendations shared with us by all parents. He has 
committed to examine and improve the program wherever he 
can. He has our foil support. 
(R. 1172.) These facts are remarkably similar to the case of Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 
267 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978), where the parents of school children 
did not present their list of grievances to [the plaintiff teacher] 
first, but instead, took it to his principal and, despite the fact that 
[the plaintiff] answered the complaints and the principal told 
[the parents] he thought [the plaintiff] was a good teacher, [the 
parents] persisted by going to the superintendent and to the 
school board with the complaints. 
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Id. at 426. There court concluded, on the foregoing facts, that "there is [not] any evidence 
here which shows actual malice." Id. Its reasoning was as follows: 
The fact that [the plaintiff teacher] denied the charges and gave 
his version and the fact that the principal told the [parents] he 
thought [the plaintiff] was a good teacher does not mean that the 
[parents], by pursuing the matter, acted with knowledge of the 
falsity of their charges. They knew he denied the allegations, 
but because of the nature of the complaints, they did not know 
they were "false" and his mere denial does not mean such 
allegations were false. Nor does the evidence show a reckless 
disregard of the truth, i.e., a high degree of awareness of 
probable falsity. If we were to hold otherwise then one the 
teacher denies any allegation of incompetency even though the 
adequacy of his answers are still in question, the matter is ended. 
We cannot condone such a result which would allow school 
officials to shield the incompetent teacher and thus defeat the 
legitimate interest of the parents in their children and the school 
system. 
Id. (citation omitted). Based on the lack of evidence for O'Connor's assertions and the 
persuasive reasoning of the Arizona court in parallel circumstances, this Court should 
conclude that, indeed, O'Connor has failed to adduce evidence of actual malice. 
O'Connor also contends that "the statements were made not to instigate a further 
investigation by the high school or by the School Board, but rather to force a change in the 
coaching position" and that this too is evidence of "a high degree or awareness of the falsity 
of these charges which had been determined to be baseless but which they nonetheless 
proceeded to repeat." (Appellant's Brief, p. 34.) Initially, as already set forth, the Parents 
had not been assured by the school administration that their concerns were baseless. To the 
contrary, they had been told, essentially, "to change their perception" or "move to another 
community." (R. 1172.) Moreover, O'Connor cites no evidence to support the assertion that 
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the Parents did not want "a further investigation" and would only be satisfied with "a change 
in the coaching position." Additionally, even if these was the Parents' sentiments,15 a "high 
degree of awareness of probable falsity" is not established merely because the Parents 
insisted on a coaching change. To the contrary, an overwhelming sentiment that a coaching 
change was in fact needed, supports a conclusion that the Parents actually believed in the 
validity of their expressed concerns. 
Having concluded that O'Connor was a public official, the Court should also 
conclude, for the foregoing reasons, that there is no evidence that the Parents' statements 
were made with actual malice; and, based on these conclusions, the Court should affirm the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Parents. 
IIL 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE 
THEIR STATEMENTS WERE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED. 
This Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
Parents because their statements were absolutely privileged.16 An "absolute privilege . . . 
extends to the proceedings of administrative officers, such as boards and commissions, so 
far as they have powers of discretion in applying the law to the facts which are regarded as 
judicial, or 'quasi-judicial' in character." Mortensen v. Life Ins. Corp., 315 P.2d 283, 284 
15
 Here again, O'Connor fails to distinguish between the individual Parent defendants, 
proceeding as though all made the same statements and were motivated by the same 
sentiments. This is plainly not the case, and his failure to cite evidence with respect to each 
of the Parents should, alone, merit this Court's dismissal of his claims. 
16
 This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court. (R. 985-86, 1313-14.) 
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(Utah 1957). In Utah, 
[n]o civil action by or on behalf of a student to the professional 
competence or performance of a licensed employee of aschool 
district,... or a violation of ethical conduct by an employee of 
a school district, may be brought in a court until at least 60 days 
after the filing of a written complaint with the local board of 
education of the district, or until findings have been issued by 
the local board after a hearing on the complaint, whichever is 
sooner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-421(l)(a). The School Board's invitation to the Parents to submit 
letters, and the comments by some Parents at the July 20,2004 School Board meeting might, 
in light of Section 53A-3-421(l)(a), properly be seen as a part of "proceedings of 
administrative officers, such as boards and commissions, so far as they have powers of 
discretion in applying the law to the facts." Mortensen, 315 P.2d at 284. Hence, this Court 
should hold that an absolute privilege attaches to the Parents' statements made in this context 
and affirm the summary judgment in favor of the Parents. 
IV. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT'S GRANT OF 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE PARENTS BECAUSE 
(1) THEIR STATEMENTS WERE QUALIFIEDLY PRIVILEGED AND 
(2) THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE PARENTS ABUSED THE 
PRIVILEGE. 
"The publication of a defamatory statement is conditionally or qualifiedly privileged 
in certain situations in which a defendant seeks to vindicate or further an interest 'regarded 
as being sufficiently important to justify some latitude for making mistakes '" Brehany 
v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49, 58 (Utah 1991). "If a qualified privilege exists, the burden 
is on the plaintiff to prove that the privilege was abused." Id. "The plaintiff can show abuse 
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of the privilege by proving that the defendant acted with malice or that the publication of the 
defamatory material extended beyond those who had a legally justified reason for receiving 
it." Id. In this case, (1) the Parents' statements were qualifiedly privileged, and (2) there is 
no evidence that the Parents abused that privilege. Accordingly, this Court should affirm the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Parents.17 
A. The Parents Statements Were Qualifiedly Privileged. 
The Parents statements were qualifiedly privileged. Section 594 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts set forth one circumstance that gives rise to a qualified privilege, and this 
Court expressly adopted Section 594 in Brehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P.2d 49 (Utah 
1991). There, the Court summarized Section 594 by explaining that "[t]he law has long 
recognized that a publication is conditionally privileged if made to protect a legitimate 
interest of the publisher." Brehany, 812 P.2d at 58; see alsoAlfordv. UtahLeague of Cities 
& Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 204 (Utah Ct App. 1990). Section 594 reads in full as follows: 
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the 
circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) there 
is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the 
publisher, and (b) the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory 
matter will be of service in the lawful protection of the interest. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 (1977). Additionally, Section 597 is a particularized 
application of the principle set forth in Section 594, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 594 
17
 This argument was raised and briefed in the trial court (R. 983-84,1188-91,1316-
1318). 
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cmt. d,18 and states in relevant part: 
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if 
the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief that (a) 
there is information that affects the well-being of a member of 
the immediate family of the publisher, and (b) the recipient's 
knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of service in the 
lawful protection of the well-being of the member of the family. 
(2) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged 
when the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable belief 
that (a) there is information that affects the well-being of a 
member of the immediate family . . . of a third person, and (b) 
the recipient's knowledge of the defamatory matter will be of 
service in the lawful protection of the well-being of the member 
of the family, and (c) the recipient has requested the publication 
of the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication 
is otherwise within generally accepted standards of decent 
conduct. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 597 (1977). 
In Brehany, the Court also endorsed Section 596, explaining that a qualified "privilege 
also extends to statements made to advance a legitimate common interest between the 
publisher and the recipient of the publication." 812 P.2d at 58. Section 596 states in Ml as 
follows: 
An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the 
circumstances lead any one of several persons having a common 
interest in a particular subject matter correctly or reasonably to 
18
 Because the rule stated in Section 597 is merely a particularized application of the 
rule stated in Section 594, it would "not [be] much of a jurisprudential leap" for this Court 
to expressly adopt Section 597. Atkinson v. Stateline Hotel Casino & Resort, 2001 UT App 
63, f 19 n. 6,21 P.3d 667 (noting that "[t]he appellate courts of this state [had] not previously 
adopted section 324 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts" and stating that doing so in that 
case was "not much of a jurisprudential leap since 'the rule stated in [section 324] is [merely] 
an application of the one stated in [section] 323.'" (citation omitted; emphasis and alterations 
in original)). 
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believe that there is information that another sharing the 
common interest is entitled to know. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 596 (1977). 
As O'Connor correctly observes, no reported Utah cases have examined the 
application of the foregoing privileges - the "common interest" privilege or the "family 
relationships" privilege - in the context of allegedly defamatory statements made by parents 
to public school officials about a teacher or coach. However, the great weight of authority 
from other jurisdictions is that these privileges apply to the facts of this case. In each of the 
following cases, the court held that parent and school administrator defamation plaintiffs 
were protected by one of the foregoing qualified privileges. See Daubenmire v. Sommers, 
805 N.E.2d 571, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding that "educators and parents share a 
common interest in the training, morality and well-being of children in their care" which 
extends to "the coaching of [a high school] team and. . . the treatment of [team] player[s]"); 
Gatto v. St. Richard School Inc., 774 N.E.2d 914, 925 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("Parents and 
schools have a 'corresponding interest' in the free flow of information about administrators 
and faculty members."); Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267, 270-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) 
(discussing the "legitimate interest of the parents in their children and the school system"); 
Martin v. Kearney, 124 Cal. Rptr. 281, 283 (1975) ("As parents of school children, 
defendants were interested persons directing their communications to other interested 
persons, the school officials"); Hoover v. Jordan, 150 P. 333, 334 (Colo. Ct. App. 1915) 
(holding that parents' petition to the school board charging that teacher was incompetent and 
immoral was protected under the common interest privilege). The statements on which 
-42-
O'Connor bases his defamation claims were all expressions of concern by the Parents for 
their girls to school administrators who shared their interest in the girls' well-being and who 
could address the Parents concerns. Accordingly, Parents enjoyed a qualified privilege when 
making the statements of which O'Connor complains. 
O'Connor asserts that the foregoing privileges should not apply to all of the Parents 
because some of them were not the actual parents of girls on the team. (Appellant's Brief, 
p. 41 ,)19 He asserts that those of the Parents who were merely "friends or relatives" of girls 
on the team do not share a common interest with the girls' parents. (Id.)20 Even if true, 
O'Connor's assertion does not deprive the "friend and relative" Parents of a qualified 
privilege in this case. In Brehany, this Court also adopted Section 595 of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, see 812 P.2d at 58, which states: 
(1) An occasion that makes a publication conditionally 
privileged if the circumstances induce a correct or reasonable 
belief that (a) there is information that affects a sufficiently 
important interest of the recipient or a third person, and (b) the 
recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty to 
publish the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its 
publication is otherwise within the generally accepted standards 
of decent conduct. 
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally 
accepted standards of decent conduct it is an important factor 
that (a) the publication is made in response to a request rather 
than volunteered by the publisher or (b) a family or other 
relationship exists between the parties. 
19
 O'Connor cites no evidence to identify which of the Parents fit into this category. 
20
 O'Connor also asserts that "the School Board members... had no common interest 
with the Parents." (Appellant's Brief, p. 41.) This assertion is belied by the above-cited 
authority from numerous jurisdictions holding to the contrary. 
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595 (1977). Applying this section to the receipt of public 
comment to school boards on the performance of school employees, the Florida Supreme 
Court explained as follows: 
Another ground for holding that the statement was conditionally 
privileged would be that the statement was made for the 
protection of the recipient's interest in receiving information on 
the performance of its employee. See Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 595 (1976). In this connection, the value of the 
defendant's defamatory information to the school board in 
overseeing the operation of the public schools must be weighed 
against the extent of the harm likely to be done to the plaintiffs 
reputation as a result of the communication. L. Eldredge, The 
Law of Defamation § 86 at 471 (1978). Under the American 
Law Institute's approach, the interest of the school board in 
the performance of a teacher, its employee, would give rise 
to a privilege in another to provide information concerning 
that performance even without a legal duty or a family 
relationship and even though the information is not 
requested but merely volunteered, if the publication is '"within 
the generally accepted standards of decent conduct." 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 595 (1976). 
Nodar v. Galbreath, 462 So.2d 803, 809 (Fla. 1984) (emphasis added). Plainly, under 
Section 595, which has been adopted by this Court, the statements by all of the Parents to the 
school board, principal, and athletics director were protected by a qualified privilege, so long 
as they were made within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct. And the 
following undisputed evidence (testimony from Alpine School Board member Donna 
Barnes) supports only the conclusion that the communications of which O'Connor complains 
were made within the generally accepted standards of decent conduct: 
Q. Okay. Do you personally believe that the parents were 
exercising their rights as parents living in the school 
district to voice concerns at a school board meeting about 
what they perceived to be problems? 
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A. That's the policy of the board, that if there are concerns, 
they may address the board in an open board meeting. It 
happens routinely. 
Q. Was everyone [at the meeting where the Parents 
addressed the board] courteous and attempting to -
A. Very courteous, very professional in their behavior. 
Q. Okay. And certainly there's nothing unusual about 
parents writing letters to be reviewed by the board as 
supplemental information to -
A. We get those routinely also. 
Q. Okay. And did you consider those to be constructive 
letters in attempting to resolve a problem? 
A. I did. 
(R. 1151a, 1239.) 
O'Connor's remaining arguments against application of a qualified privilege to the 
Parents' statements are without factual, legal, or logical support. Specifically, he argues that 
the privilege should not apply because (1) the Parents' letters "were created not at the request 
of any public authority" (Appellant's Brief, p. 38); (2) the Parents' letters "were delivered 
. . . not to a governmental body but to [a] friend and neighbor Donna Barnes, who in her 
individual capacity had no authority to deal with them" (id, pp. 38-39); and (3) "the School 
Board declined to take any action on the letters submitted to the Board and the statements 
made at the meeting" (id., p. 41). As to the first argument, the evidence is undisputed that 
the Parents' letter were requested by a public authority, in that school board member Donna 
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Barnes, after her consultation with the school board president, told the Parents that if they 
had concerns they needed to "build a case" by preparing and submitting letters. (R. 1151 a.) 
Moreover, as explained by the Nodar court, "the interest of the school board in the 
performance of a teacher, its employee, would give rise to a privilege in another to provide 
information concerning that performance . . . even though the information is not requested 
but merely volunteered" Nodar, 462 So.2d at 809. As to the second argument, O'Connor 
offers no support for the assertion that communications to a school board member must take 
place only within the confines of a duly convened board meeting for the qualified privilege 
to attach. As to the final argument, O'Connor again offers no support for the implied 
assertion that an otherwise privileged statement becomes unprivileged when, in retrospect, 
it is observed that the recipient declined to take action based on the communication. Such 
a rule, which would tie the qualified privilege to the response of the recipient, would cast a 
chill on public input to school boards and undermine the privilege. 
In sum, this Court has already adopted the principles in Sections 594, 595, and 596 
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and Section 597 is a logical extension of Section 594. 
The circumstances of this case trigger application of the principles outlined in these sections, 
O' Connor's contrary arguments notwithstanding. Hence, the Court should hold that all of the 
Parents' were qualifiedly privileged in making the statements of which O' Connor complains. 
B. There Is No Evidence that the Parents Abused Their Qualified 
Privilege. 
"[O'Connor], in order to circumvent [the Parents' qualified privilege], must show that 
[their] statements were published maliciously." See Alford v. Utah League of Cities & 
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Towns, 791 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). "Evidence of 'malice5 in this context[21] 
may include indications that the publisher [1] 'made [the statements] with ill will, [2] [that 
the statements] were excessively published, or [3] [that the publisher] did not reasonably 
believe his or her statements."' Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT 25, 
T| 53, 116 P.3d 271 (citation omitted). There is no evidence in the Record to support a 
conclusion that the Parents abused their qualified privilege by making their allegedly 
defamatory statements maliciously. 
O'Connor's asserts to the contrary, arguing that "[t]here is sufficient evidence in the 
Record to conclude that the Parents made and repeated their defamatory statements with ill 
will." (Appellant's Brief, p. 34.) He contends that evidence of the Parent's ill will is to be 
found in (1) their repeating their statements "despite receiving explanations of no financial 
improprieties and receiving the principal's assurance that there were no coaching problems 
of the type alleged; (2) certain Parents' manifested intent to have O'Connor fired; and (3) 
that "[t]hey ultimately took their complaints to a public forum," i.e., a school board meeting. 
(Id.) O'Connor's argument in this regard is without merit. First, as set forth in Section II.B, 
above, the Record does not support the assertion that the Parents received assurances from 
the principal that their concerns were unfounded. Second, that some of the Parents may have 
wanted O'Connor fired was, plainly, an outgrowth of their concerns for the girls and the 
21
 The context referred to here is that of a conditional privilege. "[M]alice in the 
context of a conditional privilege 'is simply a means of determining when the privilege 
. . . is forfeited.'" Wayment v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 2005 UT25, ^  53 n.19,116 
P.3d 271 (citation omitted). In the public official context, on the other hand, a plaintiff must 
show "actual malice," which is different than the common law malice required in this 
context. See id. 
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basketball program. "[I]f [an allegedly defamatory] publication is made for the purpose 
of protecting the interest in question, [i.e., the Parents9 interest in their daughters' well-being; 
the common interest in public education, etc.], the fact that the publication is inspired in part 
by resentment or indignation at the supposed misconduct of the person defamed does not 
constitute an abuse of the privilege." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 603 cmt. a (1977). 
Finally, O' Connor cites no authority for the proposition that privileged statements to a school 
board are lost if made at a public meeting, and there is authority for the contrary proposition 
- that the Parents did not abuse their conditional privilege by failing to insist that the school 
board meeting be closed to other members of the public. See Daubenmire v. Sommers, 805 
NJE.2d 571, 577, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (holding a qualified privilege exited where 
parents spoke out against coach at a community meeting where school board members were 
present); Sewell v. Brookbank, 581 P.2d 267, 269-71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (holding a 
qualified privilege existed where parents spoke out against teacher at a school board 
meeting). 
V. 
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO ADDRESS ISSUES 
REGARDING THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS TO THE 
PARENTS BECAUSE THOSE ISSUES ARE NOT PROPERLY 
BEFORE THIS COURT, AND IN ANY EVENT THE PARENTS' 
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS WAS TIMELY FILED. 
On January 17,2006, O'Connor filed his Notice of Appeal from the trial court's entry 
of its final order of summary judgment. The trial court did issue its ruling regarding costs 
22
 Here again, O'Connor lumps all of the Parents together and fails to demonstrate that 
all of them insisted that he be fired, or that all of them attended the school board meeting. 
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and fees until February 14, 2006. In appeals to this Court, "[t]he notice of appeal. . . shall 
designate the judgment or order, or part thereof, appealed from." Utah R. App. P. 3(d). 
O'Connor filed his Notice of Appeal prior to the trial court's ruling on costs and did not 
designate that portion of court's final order in his Notice of Appeal. Accordingly, issues 
regarding the trial court's award of costs are not properly before this Court, and the Court 
should, therefore, decline to consider them. See id. 
Even if the Court determines that this issue is properly before it, contrary to 
O'Connor's assertion, the Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was timely filed. It was 
due on January 19, 2006. Parent Defendants deposited it into the United States Postal 
Service, postage prepaid, on January 18, 2006. The rule regarding the manner of filing 
documents with the Court states: "The filing of pleadings and other papers with the court as 
required by these rules shall be made by filling them with the clerk of the court " Utah 
R. Civ. P. 5(e). This rule does not specify whether filing is complete upon mailing or upon 
receipt by the clerk, and no reported Utah case appears to have addressed this issue 
specifically with respect to rule 5(e) and the filing of a costs memorandum. In Isaacson v. 
Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983), however, the court addressed whether a notice of appeal 
was filed by mailing. The appellant offered no evidence, but claimed that he had placed his 
notice of appeal in the mail on Thursday, December 10. See id. at 850. It was due on 
Monday, December 14, but not date-stamped by the clerk until December 16. See id. In 
dissent, Justice Stewart stated: 
Counsel acted prudently in attempting to effectuate a timely 
filing of a notice of appeal in accordance with our rules of 
procedure. The reason the notice was not actually filed with the 
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court in the time prescribed by the rules was either because of 
the delay in the delivery of mail or because of the failure of the 
clerk to file the notice promptly upon receipt. In either event, 
the fault was not the appellant's. Indeed the appellant had the 
right to rely on the mail's being delivered in time and on timely 
filing by the clerk. 
Id. at 851 (Stewart, J., dissenting). The majority rejected Justice Stewart's approach, stating 
that "[t]he dissents assume facts not in the record[, L e., that the notice of appeal was actually 
mailed on December 10,] in reaching a contrary conclusion." Id. at 850 n. 1. Contrastingly 
here, there is evidence that the Parents' Verified Memorandum of Costs was indeed mailed 
on January 18,2006, the day before it was due. (R. 1540.) Accordingly, Parent Defendants 
urge the Court to adopt the approach of Justice Stewart with respect to a notice of appeal and 
conclude that filing of the Verified Memorandum of Costs was complete upon mailing.23 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment in favor of the Parents and the trial court's award of costs to the Parents. 
DATED this 5 / day of May, 2006. 
SUITTER AXLAND, PLLC 
Mkmael W. Homer 
/Jesse C. Trentadue 
/ JohnD.Luthy 
* Attorneys for Appellees 
23
 In this respect, it is notable that, according to the date stamp, if Parent Defendants' 
Verified Memorandum of Costs was not already at the Court on Thursday, January 19, on 
Friday, January 20, a postal delivery to the court, opening of the mail, and stamping of the 
document all must have occurred before 9:30 a.m., a somewhat remarkable proposition. 
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